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Abstract
Advancements in computer networks and communication technologies like software defined networks (SDN),
Internet of things (IoT), microservices architecture, cloud computing and network function virtualization
(NFV) have opened new fronts and challenges for security experts to combat against modern cyberattacks.
Relying on perimeter defense and signature-based network security solutions like Intrusion Detection and
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) have failed to deliver adequate level of security against new attack vectors
such as advance persistent threats, zero days, ransomware, botnets and other forms of targeted attacks.
Recent developments in machine learning and cognitive computing have shown great potential to detect
unknown and new intrusion events where legacy misuse and anomaly based intrusion detection systems
usually fail. In this research study we applied state of the art machine learning algorithms on UNSW-
NB15 dataset for potential applicability to detect new attacks. We also proposed a novel wrapper based
feature selection technique TS-RF using metaheuristic Tabu Search (TS) algorithm and Random Forest
(RF) ensemble classifier. Results obtained by applying proposed feature selection technique i.e. TS-RF on
UNSW-NB15 dataset show improvement in overall intrusion detection accuracy while it reduces computation
complexity as it removes more than 60% features.
Keywords: Intrusion detection, computer networks, machine learning, feature selection,
metaheuristics
1. Introduction
The Internet has revolutionized the world and helped to make it global village in real sense. Its expo-
nential growth allows us to interconnect and communicate anywhere, anytime and access various services.
This has become possible due to the advancements in network technologies, economical access of services
and availability of new products and devices. But the advancement and growth of Internet has opened new
challenges and problems for researchers and practitioners working continuously for its improvement. Secu-
rity, privacy and trust in the Internet is one of the biggest challenge faced not only by industries, government
organizations etc., but also for a common user.
Internet is a public network, which is open and used by all [1]. There is deafening increase in the numbers
of cyberattacks performed every year. In computers and computer networks an attack is any attempt to
expose, alter, disable, destroy, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an Asset
[2]. Main findings on cyberattacks statistics published by Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR)
2018 [3] are given below:
1. 92% increase in new Malware variants in 2017, where Malware or malicious software is any program
or file which is harmful to a computer.
2. 600% increase in the number of attacks since 2016 against devices and sensors connected to Internet.
Devices, sensors, actuators connected to Internet to share their statuses and take instructions from
the server are usually known as Internet of things (IoT).
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3. 54% increase in the mobile Malware variants.
4. 45% increase in the new Ransomware and 13% increase in the number of reported vulnerabilities
(any weakness in the system, software or process). Ransomware is a type of malicious software that
threatens to publish the victim’s data or perpetually block access to it unless a ransom is paid. It has
gain more visibility after the widespread of Ransomware name WannaCry in May 2017 [4].
Gaining unauthorized access of systems, resources or communications for malicious intent is not new.
Such notable incidents dated back to World War II era [5]. As discussed earlier, due to the ubiquitousness of
new affordable technologies cybercrimes have gained significant momentum. This wild growth of cybercrimes
have different reasons and motivations. Taylor [6] discussed several reasons and Brewster et al. presented
attack motivations taxonomy in [7]. They discussed many motivations like political, ideological, commercial,
emotional, financial, personal, etc, which can be behind a cyberattack.
Main reason and motivations for launching cyberattacks are:
1. Political or social cause: different incidents have been reported where hackers interfere to influence
social or a political cause. A. Bessi, E. Ferrara [8], B. Kollanyi et.al [9] and H. Allcott and M. Gentzkow
[10] discussed and explained how social bots distort 2016 US Presidential Election online discussion.
Such hacking activities and groups of hackers are usually sponsored by the state or the competitors of
the target organization. [11].
2. Easy and control free availability of tools: basic but often neglected reason of increase numbers of
cyberattacks is the easy and control free availability of tools and procedures used by hackers. As a
result, a user can easily launch an attack without requiring a detail and technical understanding of
the underlying technologies and infrastructure. Hansman [12] discussed that attack sophistication has
been increased and intruder knowledge or skills which are required to perpetuate an attacks has been
reduced over years.
3. Financial gain: Ransomware is the most common type of cyberattack used for obtaining financial
gains.
With these numbers and severity of attacks traditional security solutions like Anti-Virus (AV), firewalls,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) etc. have been questioned for their reliability in detecting and providing
safeguard against advance attacks. Antivirus (AV) can only block and stop the execution of any malicious
or un-wanted program on the hosts. They usually work on the principle of signatures or patterns of bad
programs or executables. A virus signature is a continuous sequence of bytes that is common for a certain
malware sample [13].
Conventional firewalls can only allow and deny traffic on the basis of Open system Interconnection (OSI)
[14] - network layer IP Addresses [15] and transport layer port numbers [15], they are usually known as
stateful firewalls. They cannot perform deep packet inspection (DPI) [16] to inspect and look inside the
packets for any kind of intrusions or malware.
With the advent of unified threat management (UTM) [17] and next generation based firewalls (NGFW)
[18], firewalls can now look beyond packet headers. They can inspect and filter traffic on the basis of
payload. Payload is actual message or data generated by the source machine for its intended recipient.
These firewalls are also known as application and user aware firewalls because they can detect applications
or protocols streams following through them and allow security administrators to apply policies on the basis
of applications or users instead of fixed port numbers and IP Addresses. They also have built-in mechanism
to detect intrusions.
Karen and Mell [19] defines intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a
computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or
imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security
practices. Furthermore, the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is a system that has all the capabilities of
an IDS, and it can attempt to block possible incidents [20].
In this paper we proposed a new wrapper based feature selection method which is based on Tabu Search
(TS) metaheuristic optimization algorithm [21, 22]. For discussion on different feature selection methods
refer Section 6. We used TS for feature search while Random Forest as a learning method. Results discussed
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in section 6.3 show that TS outperformed all other feature selection method by improving classifier accuracy
sufficiently at reduced feature space by 60%.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents details related to Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS). Section 3 presents review of legacy and recent IDS datasets. Section 4 discussed UNSW-NB15 dataset
at length. Section 5 discussed machine learning algorithms used in our study and their findings. Section
6 discussed different feature selection methods studied and applied in our paper followed by the results
obtained from TS-RF, conclusion and future directions.
2. An Overview of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
An Intrusion Detection Prevention System (IDS, IPS) plays an integral role to strengthen the security
posture of an organization. Historically, an IDS is categorized as anomaly-based and misuse-based. Misuse-
based IDS is also known as signature based IDS. However, modern IDS can be classify based on different
parameters discussed below [23].
1. Detection Methodologies
2. Detection Approach
3. Analysis Target
4. Reaction on Intrusion Event
5. Analysis Timing
6. Architecture
2.1. Detection Methodologies
Liao [23] and Scarfone [19] defines three different intrusion detection methodologies. These are: Signature-
based Detection (SD), Anomaly-based Detection (AD) and Stateful Protocol Analysis (SPA) based detection
methodologies. We will discuss detection methods in more detail because these are the core components of
any IDS.
2.1.1. Signature-based IDS
A signature based intrusion detection system uses intrusion signatures to detect intrusions. An intrusion
signature is a pattern or string that corresponds to known attack or threat. Signature-based intrusion
detection systems have huge database of known attacks or threats. They monitor every packet flowing
through the network or system’s activity and try to compare it with signature database. If a signature
is matched then they trigger an appropriate alert. On the basis of generated alert, the prevention engine
may block that intrusion activity. Signature-based IDS are also known as knowledge-based or misuse-based
IDS. The examples of signature based IDS are Snort, Suricata [24]. Signature-based detection has shown
promising results to detect known threats but it is proved ineffective at detecting novel or new type of
threats or intrusions, because they do not have signatures for them.
2.1.2. Anomaly-based IDS
Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (AD) use anomalies to detect intrusions. An anomaly can
be considered as deviation from the known behavior. Anomaly-based IDS first build profiles or develop a
model of normal or expected behavior of the system, it is also called baseline. Profiles are usually build
using continuous monitoring or training of the system over a period of time. When profile building process
is completed then IDS is deployed to detect intrusions, based on the deviations from the baseline or what it
had learn during the training period [25].
The main benefit of anomaly-based IDS is the their potential to detect unknown or novel attacks.
However one of the biggest challenge of anomaly based IDS is False Positive Rate (FPR). Anomaly-based
IDS are prune to generate high false positives because of any benign activity that deviates significantly from
profiles will lead to generate false alarm.
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Table 1: Pros and Cons of Intrusion Detection Methodologies
Signature-based Anomaly-based Stateful Protocol Analy-
sis
Pros
• Simplest & effective detection
methodology
• High detection rate with less
false positive
• Provide more granular con-
textual analysis of attack(s)
• Effective to detect
new and unforeseen
vulnerabilities and
attacks.
• Facilitate the detec-
tion of variant of at-
tacks
• Efficient at detecting
protocol design level
vulnerabilities and
flaws.
• Can distinguish unex-
pected sequence or pro-
tocol dialogs.
Cons
• Ineffective to detect unknown
(new) attacks,evasion attacks,
and variants of known attacks
• Difficult to maintain signa-
ture database up to date
• Difficult to build ac-
curate model or pro-
file
• Requires significant
training time
• Generate large false
positives
• Resource hungry
method
• Limited capabilities to
detect OS or API level
attacks
2.1.3. Stateful Protocol Analysis-based IDS
Stateful protocol analysis-based IDS can perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to compare protocol
deviations from the predetermined or standard profiles of generally accepted definitions of normal protocol
activities [19]. DPI refers to the capability to look inside the packets’ payload. The stateful refers to the
fact that these IDS can understand various protocol dialogs and their hand-shaking processes [26]. These
IDS can also detect unexpected sequences of commands during connection establishment process. Thus it
makes an IDS capable to detect and block intrusions at protocol level.
A main benefit of stateful protocol analysis-based IDS is they show good detection against the specific
inherent vulnerabilities exist in the protocols’ design or its structure. However, they are very resource-
intensive because of the complexity of the analysis and overhead involved in performing ”state” tracking.
State tracking is a process in which IDS keeps track of type and state information of the protocol dialogs
or messages exchanged between sender and receiver. Comparison of all three detection methodologies are
presented in Table 1.
2.2. Detection Approaches
Liao [23] classify intrusion detection systems in five different classes. The basic classification criteria is
their characteristics and detection techniques which are discussed below.
2.2.1. Statistics-based
Statistics-based intrusion detection approach uses different statistical methods like Baye’s theorem [27],
probability, mean, standard deviation etc. to identify abnormal behavior. They build a model or profile of
normal and malicious activities of traffic and calculate the probability of the new events to correctly classify
it.
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2.2.2. Pattern-based
Pattern-based detection techniques focus on patterns of known attacks through string matching, regular
expression and pattern recognition. They are very similar to signature based IDS discussed in section 2.1.1.
2.2.3. Rule-based
A simple rule based approach works on the principle of if-else conditions matching. For example, if an
internal host is trying to establish a connection with an external server, the IDS will first check and verify
the reputation of the Internet Protocol (IP) address or domain name of the target machine, if the domain
name is blacklisted at Domain Name System based Blackhole List (DNSBL) [28] or Real-time Blackhole
List (RBL) [29] or other reputation based databases, the connection attempt should be blocked.
2.2.4. State-based
State-based detection methods exploit the behavior of finite state machine [30]. They continuously
monitor and keep tracks of machines’ states in terms of sessions, packets in and out, number of connections
to specific host or IP address etc. Once they establish a state-transition maps or state tables of active
connections, they can look for any possible intrusions.
2.2.5. Heuristics-based
Heuristic are used to find quality solution within reasonable time frame. Heuristic based detection
approaches are usually inspired from biological behavior of different animals or birds and artificial intelligence
[31]
2.3. Analysis Target
Analysis target dictates the prime purpose of the IDS being used. Based on what they can inspect or
monitor, where they can be deployed and what sort of potential malicious activities they can detect and
block, we can further divide IDS into different analysis target sub-classes. These are discussed and described
below.
1. Network-based IDS (NIDS)
2. Host-based IDS (HIDS)
3. Application-based IDS (AIDS)
4. Wireless-based IDS (WIDS)
5. Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) based IDS
6. Mixed IDS (MIDS)
2.3.1. Network-based IDS (NIDS)
Network based intrusion detection systems usually deployed at network transit points where most of the
network traffic is passed [32]. The core principle of network based IDS is to monitor network traffic and
looks for possible intrusions by exploiting different methodologies and approaches discussed in Section 2.1
and 2.2.
2.3.2. Host-based IDS (HIDS)
Host based intrusion detection systems actively monitors hosts activities for any potential malicious
activity [33, 34]. It includes hosts’ process tables, network connections (ins and outs), registry entries,
filesystem activities, prefetch items etc. and try to analyze their behavior for any signs of abnormality.
2.3.3. Wireless-based IDS (WIDS)
Wireless-based IDS is very similar to network-based IDS (NIDS), but it captures wireless network traffic,
such as wireless ad-hoc networks, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), wireless mesh networks, Wireless Body
Area Networks (WBAN) etc. [35].
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2.3.4. Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) based IDS
Network Behavior Analysis (NBA) based IDS inspects network traffic to recognize attacks with unex-
pected traffic flows. For example it tries to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attack, certain type of malware,
backdoors etc. [36]. NBA based IDS usually have a set of sensors deployed at different network segments
and a console for central reporting and monitoring of network alerts.
2.3.5. Mixed or Hybrid IDS (MIDS)
Mixed or hybrid IDS can incorporate different family of IDS discussed above. It provides more detail
and accurate detection and prevention against attacks [36]. Hybrid IDS solutions actually mitigate the
weakness and limitations of one another. Adopting multiple technologies as MIDS can fulfill the goal for a
more complete and accurate detection.
2.4. Reaction on Intrusion Events
IDS can be classified based on how they respond to an intrusion event and there are two ways to do that
which are discussed below.
2.4.1. Passive
Passive IDS only generates alerts or notifications when it encounter any intrusion event.
2.4.2. Active
On the other hand, active IDS have capabilities to take some actions based on the type of intrusion. For
example, it can terminate live streams by sending RESET packets, covering holes, shutdown services, and
start logging an intruder.
2.5. Analysis Timing
IDS can be classified based on how their analysis engine works. Analysis engine is the core component
of any IDS. When IDS receives a packet from different streams or it monitors host activities then those
activities or traffic must be analyzed in order to detect possible intrusions. Analysis engine actually apply
different methodologies and detection techniques discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 to detect true intrusions.
Event analysis is usually performed in two ways (i) online real-time analysis of events and (ii) periodic
online or offline analysis.
2.5.1. Online real-time analysis of events
Online real-time analysis engine detects intrusions in real-time mode. NIDS receives network traffic from
different sources (uplink, downlink) streams and analyze the traffic on the fly as they receive it. Online
realtime analysis engine demands extreme computational power to process high traffic volume to generate
useful alerts in timely manner.
2.5.2. Periodic online or offline analysis
Periodic online or offline analysis engine does not operate in real-time mode. Rather the analysis engine
is invoked on periodic intervals, performs analysis for fixed time interval. Periodic offline engines work on
collected historical network or host activities. These analysis timing do not require high computational
power, however the biggest draw back of periodic online analysis engine is that it can miss real intrusion
events.
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3. Review of IDS Datasets
In this research paper we apply different state of the art Machine Learning (ML) algorithms which are
discussed in Section 5. ML is a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that deals with the study of algorithms
and statistical models to empower machines to learn and take smart decisions. Any ML based algorithm
requires dataset to build that model. So in this section we will present a brief overview of different available
IDS datasets.
Dataset plays a crucial role in the performance evaluation and testing of any IDS. There are different
IDS datasets which have been proposed in last two decades [37]. Usually a dataset consists of number of
attributes known as input vector or feature vector and an output (class label) see Section 5 for details. For
the purpose of understanding we have divided the datasets into two categories i.e. Legacy datasets and
Recent datasets.
3.1. Legacy Datasets
All those datasets which are created and proposed between 1998 and 2008 are grouped into legacy
datasets.
3.1.1. DARPA Datasets (1998-99)
MIT Lincoln lab built two datasets which are known as DARPA’98 & ’99 [38] datasets. DARPA’98 and
DARPA’99 datasets consist of several weeks of network traffic captured by using tcpdump [39] tool ( a utility
which is used to capture packets from the network). Captured network traffic data is later stored in Packet
CAPture files generally known as PCAP files. These dataset faced serious limitations such as (i) existence
of duplicated records (ii) Unbalanced samples of normal and attack traffic classes and (iii) comprises of
synthetic traffic only. Traffic simulated with the help of a software or a hardware to emulate the behavior
of a real user is known as synthetic traffic.
3.1.2. KDDCup99 dataset (1999)
Stolfo et al. [40, 41] built the dataset for Knowledge Discovery Contest’ 99 (KDD’99) contest. It
was inherited from DARPA’98 dataset having 41 features. KDD’99 dataset consists of four main attack
categories which are Denial of Service (DoS), User to Root (U2R), Remote to Local (R2L) and Probing
Attacks. Training set consists of 24 variants of these attacks while 14 different attack variants are present
in test data only.
3.1.3. NSL-KDD Dataset (2000)
Tavallaee et al. [42] discovered that KDDCup’99 dataset has some serious weaknesses (i) large number
of redundant records (ii) low difficulty level of records in the dataset, etc. Tavallaee et al. enhanced the
KDDCup’99 dataset by developing NSL-KDD dataset. From the original dataset, they removed a large
number of duplicated records, and applied a methodology to improve the record’s difficulty level in the
dataset.
3.1.4. DEFCON Datasets (2002)
DEFCON-8 dataset was developed in 2000. It contains port scanning and buffer overflow attacks only.
DEFCON-10 dataset was created in 2002. It contains network traffic captured during a hacking competition
known as Capture The Flag (CTF). Hackers were divided into blue team (defenders) and red team (attack-
ers). The traffic produced during CTF is very different from real world network traffic since it contains
mostly intrusive traffic without any normal background traffic. Due to this limitation, DEFCON dataset
has been found useful only in evaluating alert correlation techniques [43].
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3.2. Recent Datasets
As discussed in Section 1 threat landscape is totally changed over last few years. So researchers developed
new datasets to address and incorporate new types of attacks like botnet, ransomware etc. and to collect
traffic that is more realistic and similar to modern user behavior. Botnet is an overlay covert channel used
to communicate and control infected hosts on the Internet [44]. Some of the notable datasets published in
last decade are briefed in this section.
3.2.1. Sperotto (2008)
Sperotto et al. [45] created a flow based IDS dataset in 2008. Sperotto dataset is labeled real traffic.
The main issue with this dataset is that the amount of traffic collected, which is very low and the network
topology is very simple. They only monitor a single host (honeypot) connected to a university campus
network. A honeypot is a network-attached decoy system exploited to attract attackers and to detect,
deflect or study their hacking tactics [46]. Authors claim that dataset volume is sufficient for IDS study
however they merely collected 6 days of traffic, which is not sufficient to study and test new type of attacks
and their variants based on daily and weekly traffic evolution patterns.
Labeling of the dataset is also questionable. Labeling is performed based on the logs collected from the
honeypot system, what makes it dependable on the detection system configuration and the log processing.
3.2.2. MAWI Working Lab Dataset (2010)
This dataset is contributed by MAWILab [47] (Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) since
from 2010. It contains set of labeled traffic in the MAWI archive (sample points B and F). The archive
contains daily traffic of 15 minutes captured in a link between Japan and the United States. Although the
archive contains traces since 2001 but only the traffic since 2007 is labeled. The labels are generated by
using a combination of several anomaly detection classifiers. This dataset is really extensive and allows the
analysis for a very long period. The main limitation is that the trace is obtained only during a 15 minutes
period per day. In addition, the labeling is dependent on the classifiers that have been used in the process
and their generation of false positives.
3.2.3. UNB ISCX2012 (2012)
This dataset was created by Shiravi et al. [48]. The notable contribution of this dataset is the use of
traffic profiles (i.e. α&β) for the traffic generation. The authors define α profiles for attack traffic and β
profiles for background (normal) traffic. They developed and tested their idea in a network consists of 17
Windows XP workstations and a single Windows 7 computer. They collected data for 7 days. The main
drawbacks of this dataset nowadays are its reduced duration, the use of somehow old operating systems
WindowsXP , and the use of synthetic traffic.
3.2.4. CTU-13 (2013)
This dataset is presented in [25]. It contains traffic of 13 different malware captures in a real network
environment. The traffic flows consists of labeled botnet, normal and background traffic. Here background
traffic means the authors are not really able to decide if it is malicious activity or not. For privacy reasons,
pcap files are only offered when no information about the network is present, e.g. a single host with synthetic
traffic, however flow traces are available in several formats.
The main limitation of this dataset is the capture duration which is short duration of the traces, that
impedes building models that consider cyclostationary evolution. Other limitation is with background traffic.
The authors say that it is obtained from a university router, but no more details about topology or services
are provided.
3.2.5. UNSW-NB15 (2015)
.
The above mentioned datasets cannot meet current research requirements due to dynamically changing
security and operational demands of a network. Despite of having dataset intrinsic weaknesses, they do not
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Table 2: Dataset statistics presents the total number of flows, simulation periods, the total of source bytes, the destination
bytes, the number of source packets, the number of destination packets, protocol types, the number of normal and abnormal
records and the number of unique source/destination IP addresses
Statistical features 16 hours 15 hours
No. of flows 987,627 976,882
Source bytes 4,860,168,866 5,940,523,728
Destination bytes 44,743,560,943 44,303,195,509
Source packets 41,168,425 41,129,810
Destination packets 53,402,915 52,585,462
Protocol types
TCP 771,488 720,665
UDP 301,528 688,616
ICMP 150 374
Others 150 374
Label
Normal 1,064,987 1,153,774
Attack 22,215 299,068
Unique
Source IP 40 41
Destination IP 40 45
have modern day normal traffic nor they have updated attack patterns. UNSW-NB15 dataset is recently
proposed by Moustafa et al. [49] to address these issues. It is a hybrid dataset which consists of real
modern normal network activities coupled with synthetic updated attacks. This is the main motivation to
use UNSW-NB15 dataset for our research.
UNSW-NB15 dataset is generated with the help of attack generation tool called IXIA PerfectStorm. It
contain nine families of real and updated attacks against several servers. Authors’ collected tcpdump traces
of the network traffic, for a total duration of 31 hours at the beginning of 2015. From these network logs,
they generated a dataset consists of 49 features for every network flow. A complete detail about dataset
creation process, architectural framework, feature extraction phases and dataset’s issues will be presented
in the next Section 4.
4. Anatomy of UNSW-NB15 Dataset
Section 3.2.5 discusses the motivation and reasons behind the use of UNSW-NB15 dataset for our re-
search. In this section we will discuss:
1. UNSW-NB15 dataset creation process
2. Architectural framework
3. Feature extraction process
4. Dataset distribution and Issues
4.1. UNSW-NB15 Dataset Creation Process
This dataset is generated with the help IXIA [50] traffic generator tool which is configured with three
virtual servers. First and third server were configured to generate normal network traffic while Server 2 was
build to generate abnormal or malicious attack traffic. Considering network performance and exploitation
methodology, IXIA is configured to generate one attack per second in phase 1. However, in the second phase
of the simulation, IXIA is configured to launch ten attacks per seconds. In total, testbed generated 100 GB
of trace data in two episodes of 16 and 15 hours each. Table 2 presents statistical summary of both phases
of the simulation.
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Figure 1: Framework Architecture for Generating UNSW-NB15 data set
4.2. Architectural Framework
Figure 1 elaborates the complete model developed to create UNSW-NB15 dataset. The process starts
from traffic capturing phase which is achieved with help of tcpdump utility. The captured traffic is stored
in pcap files which are then feed into Argus [51] and Bro-IDS [52] for features extraction. Once features are
extracted, the output is compared with total number of flows for any discrepancy.
4.3. Feature Extraction Phases
In UNSW-NB15 dataset creation process, features extraction is performed with the help of Argus [51],
Bro-IDS [52] and custom utilities [49]. The pcap files are feed into Argus and Bro-IDS. Argus has the
capability to process raw network traffic. It works on client-server model, where Argus-server transforms
raw pcaps files into Argus compatible format. Argus-client then able to read and extract features from
Argus files.
Bro-IDS is an open-source network traffic analyzer and anomaly detector. It is predominantly a security
monitor that inspects all network traffic against malicious activities. The Bro-IDS tool is configured to
generate three log files (i) conn file which records all connection information seen on the pcap files (ii) http
file which includes all HTTP requests and replies and (iii) ftp file which records all activities of the FTP
protocol.
The output of Argus and Bro-IDS is feed into MS-SQL server database for cross-matching of features
and in order to extract more features by using flow features as represented in Table 3. The ’Type’ field in
Tables 3, 4, 6 , 5, 7 and 8 represents the datatype of the attribute. Type field includes N: nominal, I: integer,
F: float, T: timestamp and B: binary types. All these tables represent features of UNSW-NB15 dataset,
these tables are split into multiple tables for better readability based on their family.
4.4. Matched Features of Argus & Bro-IDS Tools
These features include a variety of packet and flow based features. These features are generated by cross
matching of features generated by Argus and Bro-IDS tool. Flow based features require low computational
overhead as compared to packet based features which perform DPI because they only analyze connected
packets of the network traffic. Furthermore flow based features are based on direction, inter-arrival time
and inter-packet length [53]. The matched features are categorized into three groups (i) Basic, (ii) Content,
and (iii) Time which are described in Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
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Table 3: Flow based features require low computational overhead as compared to packet based features which perform DPI
because they only analyze connected packets of the network traffic. Furthermore flow based features are based on a direction,
an inter-arrival time and an inter-packet length [53]
# Name Type Description
1 srcip N Source IP address
2 sport I Source port number
3 dstip N Destination IP address
4 dsport I Destination port number
5 proto N Transaction protocol
Table 4: Basic Features
# Name Type Description
6 state N The state and its dependent protocol,e.g.
ACC, CLO, else (-)
7 dur F Record total duration
8 sbytes I Source to destination bytes
9 dbytes I Destination to source bytes
10 sttl I Source to destination time to live
11 dttl I Destination to source time to live
12 sloss I Source packets retransmitted or dropped
13 dloss I Destination packets retransmitted or dropped
14 service N http, ftp, ssh, dns ..,else (-)
15 slaod F Source bits per second
16 dload F Destination bits per second
17 spkts I Source to destination packet count
18 dpkts I Destination to source packet count
Table 5: Content Based Features
# Name Type Description
19 swin I Source TCP window advertisement
20 dwin I Destination TCP window advertisement
21 stcpb I Source TCP sequence number
22 dtcpb I Destination TCP sequence number
23 smeansz I Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the src
24 dmeansz I Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the dst
25 trans depth I the depth into the connection of http
request/response transaction
26 res bdy len I The content size of the data transferred from the
servers http service
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Table 6: Time based Features
# Name Type Description
27 sjit F Source jitter (mSec)
28 djit F Destination jitter (mSec)
29 stime T record start time
30 dtime T record last time
31 ltime F Source inter-packet arrival time (mSec)
32 sintpkt F Destination inter-packet arrival time (mSec)
33 dintpkt F The sum of ’synack’ and ’ackdat’ of the TCP.
34 tcprtt F The time between the SYN and the SYN ACK
packets of the TCP.
35 synack F The time between the SYN ACK and the ACK
packets of the TCP.
‘
4.5. Additional features from the matched features
Authors [49] generated additional twelve features from the matched features are depicted in Table 7. This
table is divided into two parts according to the nature and purpose of the additional generated features.
The features from 36-40 are considered as ’general purpose features’ whereas from 41-47 are labelled as
’connection features’. In the general purpose features, each feature has its own purpose, according to the
defense point of view, whereas connection features are solely created to provide defense during attempt to
connection scenarios.
4.6. Labelled Features
Dataset labeling is performed with the help of report generated by IXIA tool. This report consists of
eleven attributes, e.g. (start time, last time, attack category, attack subcategory, protocol, source address,
source port, destination address, destination port, attack name and attack reference). The data set is
labelled according to Table 8.
4.7. Data Set Records Distribution and Issues
UNSW-NB15 dataset contains more than 2.5 million records if we apply ML on the whole dataset it will
demand a lot of computational resources which will not be feasible. However, Authors [49] has provided a
partition of dataset which can be used for machine learning. Distribution of different attack categories and
normal traffic is presented in Figure 2. From this figure we can analyze that dataset is highly imbalanced
that will effect classification accuracy as discussed in Section 5.3. The major categories of the records are
normal and attack. The attack records are further classified into nine families according to the nature of
the attacks.
1. Fuzzers
2. Analysis
3. Backdoors
4. DoS
5. Exploits
6. Generic
7. Reconnaissance
8. Shellcodes
9. Worms
* Explanation of these attacks is out of scope of this article.
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Table 7: Additional Generated Features
# Name Type Description
36 is sm ips ports B If source (1) equals to destination (3)IP
addresses and port numbers (2)(4) are
equal, this variable takes value 1 else 0
37 ct state ttl I No. for each state (6) according to
specific range of values for
source/destination time to live (10) (11).
38 ct flw http mthd I No. of flows that has methods such as Get
and Post in http service
39 is ftp login B If the ftp session is accessed by user and
password then 1 else 0.
40 ct ftp cmd I No of flows that has a command in ftp
session.
Connection features
41 ct srv src I No. of connections that contain the same
service (14) and source address (1) in 100
connections according to the last time
(26).
42 ct srv dst I No. of connections that contain the same service
(14) and destination address (3) in
100 connections according to the last time
(26).
43 ct dst ltm I No. of connections of the same
destination address (3) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).
44 ct src ltm I No. of connections of the same source
address (1) in 100 connections according
to the last time (26).
45 ct src dport ltm I No of connections of the same source
address (1) and the destination port (4) in
100 connections according to the last time
(26).
46 ct dst sport ltm I No of connections of the same destination
address (3) and the source port (2) in 100
connections according to the last time
(26).
47 ct dst src ltm I No of connections of the same source (1)
and the destination (3) address in in 100
connections according to the last time
(26).
Table 8: Labelled Features
# Name Type Description
48 attack cat N The name of each attack category. In this data set, nine categories
(e.g., Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic,
Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Worms)
49 Label B 0 for normal and 1 for attack records
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Figure 2: UNSW-NB15 Dataset Distribution of the Partition [49]
5. Machine Learning Experiments and Results
In this section we will present the machine learning experiments performed and their findings. Machine
learning can be classified into different types e.g. (i) Supervised, (ii) Unsupervised (iii) Reinforcement
Learning. In supervised machine learning, training data along with label is provided to the algorithm to
create a model. Training data consists of input vector (known as features) and output (class label). Once
model is constructed, the performance of the model is evaluated on test data. Supervised machine learning
process is shown in Figure 3.
5.1. Algorithm Selection
Machine learning algorithms are classified into different families based on how they operate. Parametric,
non-parametric, probability based, tree based, neural neworks based etc. are most commonly employed
algorithms. In this research, we choose algorithms from diverse categories. We include following algorithms
in our experiments.
1. Naive Bayes Classifier (NB) - Probabilistic
2. K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) - Non-parametric
3. Random Forest (RF) - Tree based classifier
4. Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) - Motivated by human brain operation
5.1.1. Naive Bayes Classifier (NB)
Naive Bayes classifier is a probabilistic classifier that works on the principle of conditional probability.
Conditional probability says that what is the probability of occurring an event given that a certain event
has already occurred. After calculating the conditional probability of an event it applies Bayes theorem to
predict the correct class of the instance. Conditional probability and Bayes theorem can be calculated as
per Equation 1 and 2 respectively.
P (A|C) = P (A,C)
P (C)
(1)
P (C|A) = P (A|C)P (C)
P (A)
(2)
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Figure 3: Supervised Machine Learning Workflow
5.1.2. K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN)
K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) is one of the most simplest nonparametric technique to classify samples [54].
It computes the nearest distances of a query xq from the given points in the sample space. For classification
problems, NN(k, xq), it assigns the unlabeled point to the class of its k nearest neighbors by plurality voting.
To avoid ties, k is always chosen to be an odd number.
Number of different techniques have been proposed in literature [55] to calculate nearest distance of
a neighbor such as, City block distance (Manhattan distance), Euclidean distance, Chebyshev distance,
Hamming distance etc. Usually distance are measured with Minkowski distance or Lp norm, which is
defined in Eq. 3
Lp(xj, xq) =
(
Σ|xj,i − xq,i|p)1/p (3)
where,
xq: query point,
xj : example point,
if p = 1 it is Manhattan distance,
if p = 2 it will be Euclidean distance
Different ’k’ values will result in different outputs. Higher k values will lead to overfitting issues and
lower will cause underfitting problem. Thus an optimal value of k should be considered. We configured k=3
in our simulation.
5.1.3. Random Forest (RF)
Random Forest is basically a tree based classifier that builds a set of decision trees randomly. The
classification of an input sample is determined by the majority classification by the ensemble. It utilizes
different ensemble techniques [56] that is why it is also categorized as ensemble classifier. It can perform
classification and regression tasks. The performance of RF classifier is generally better than decision tress
on unseen data [57].
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Figure 4: A schematic representation of a neuron
5.1.4. Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
Multilayer perceptron is a feed forward Artificial Neural Network (ANN) inspired from human Neural
Network (NN) [58]. A typical MLP consists of input, output and a number of hidden layers or computational
units [59]. Inputs are fed to input layer in the form of feature vector. Input is processed by the hidden layers
and the purpose of output layer is to generate the output i.e. the label in this case. At hidden layer there is
a learning algorithm that adjusts the synaptic weights associated with each neuron to reduce the error [60]
and the activation function. The activation function simply applies a threshold and squishes the response
very similar to as biological neurons. Number of activation functions have been proposed in the literature as
in [61]. The choice of the activation function depends upon the nature of the problem and system designer.
Figures 4 shows the schematic representation of a neuron. Mathematically, MLP can be defined as:
y(x) = f
( n∑
i=1
xiwi + b
)
(4)
where, xi and wi are inputs and weights respectively. b is bias and f is the activation function.
5.2. Evaluation Criteria
In literature different methods are proposed to measure the accuracy of a classifier (i) Separate Training
and Test Sets (ii) k -fold Cross-validation (iii) N -fold Cross-validation (iv) Leave One Out [62]. We will use k
fold Cross-Validation (CV) technique because it tries to reduce overfitting. Overfitting is a serious problem
in ML in which model tries to predict a trend that is too noisy.
problem with different values of k for each classifier.
k-Fold Cross-Validation Technique:
In k fold cross validation approach dataset of ’N’ number of samples is divided into k equal parts known
as folds. If N is not exactly divisible by k, the final part will have fewer instances than the other k − 1
parts. k rounds of training and testing are performed. In each round k− 1 folds are used for training and a
different fold for testing or validation [63] is used. After the completion of all rounds the overall predictive
accuracy and standard error is calculated as per the Equation 5 and 6 respectively.
Average Accuracy =
1
N
k∑
i=1
(
Correctly Classified Instances
)
(5)
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Classifier
Accuracy (in percentage)
10 8 6 4 2
KNN 76.56 76.02 75.50 75.00 74.49
NB 52.90 52.43 51.67 51.19 50.59
RF 82.14 81.64 81.34 80.92 80.31
MLP 69.56 69.06 68.58 68.08 67.61
Table 9: k folds Cross-validation summary
Standard Error =
√
p(1− p)/N (6)
where, p is the average predictive accuracy calculated by using Eq. 5
5.3. Results
As discussed in Section 5.2 we used k -fold cross validation technique to measure classifiers’ accuracy. We
tried different values of k (10, 8, 6, 4, 2) to further reduce the variance. Variance is an error from sensitivity
to small fluctuations in the training set [64]. Table 9 portrays average accuracy of classifiers for all folds.
We observed that there is a marginal difference in the accuracy with different values of k in k-folds rounds
which shows that dataset is well distributed even for k=2 worse case classifier performed well. The average
accuracy of all classifiers for all folds is 75.51%, 51.76%, 81.27% and 68.58% for k Nearest Neighbor, Naive
Based, Random Forest and Multi Layer Perceptron respectively. Classifiers average accuracy is calculated
by taking arithmetic mean of classifiers’ accuracy over all folds.
Figure 5: Attack Detection vs Traffic Type and Sample Size
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Attack detection trend with respect to sample size for different types of attacks is presented in the Figure
5. It shows classifier detection accuracy with respect to different types of attacks and corresponding class
instances. Few notable observations from this graph are presented below.
1. Attack detection rate is directly proportional to the sample size of the respective traffic or attack
category. It means that traffic category having large number of samples are more likely to be correctly
classified and vice-versa.
2. Detection rate can be improved further if we increase number of samples for that traffic or have more
balanced dataset.
3. Since NB classifier works on the principle of conditional probabilities see Section 5.1.1, it almost failed
to detect DoS and Reconnaissance attacks despite of having reasonable sample size. Because in DoS
and Reconnaissance, every packet or hacking attempt or flow is autonomous and independent of the
previous one having no causal relationship or dependency.
4. Similarly NB accuracy for detecting backdoors and shellcodes traffic is relatively better than other
classifiers, because hackers perform a series of attacks to exploit backdoor or shellcode in a system,
that possibly gave rise to the causal relation between different events and thus the accuracy.
Figure 6 presents the confusion matrix for all four classifiers used in our study. In machine learning,
Confusion Matrix (CM) is used to visually analyzed classifier behavior in predicting classes and confusion
across classes. Each row of the matrix represents the instances in a predicted class while each column
represents the instances in an actual class (or vice versa). CM is a diagonal matrix in ideal case. Few
notable observations from the confusion matrices are presented below.
1. All classifiers confused between worms and exploits. Worm is a type of malware that spreads itself
from one computer to another without any human interaction [65]. An exploit is a piece of software,
or a sequence of commands that takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability present in a software or
hardware system [66].
2. NB also misclassified worm as shellcode, shellcode is a payload of an exploit. So few possible causes of
misclassification may be (i) Worm has small sample size (ii) Overlapping features set. So in order to
address this issue we should increase its sample size or we need to extract more distinguished features
from the actual dataset.
3. Analysis is the second most misclassified attack after worms. It contains port scanning, spam messages
and html files penetrations [49]. One obvious reason of misclassification is low samples size as compared
to other classes see Figure 5
4. Similarly all classifiers become confused to detect backdoors correctly. However NB detection rate is
relatively better than other classifiers because of its working methodology as discussed above.
The amount of traffic an IDS needs to monitor is very large even for a small size home network. Traffic
analysis and attack detection becomes more exhaustive, time consuming and computationally expensive
process. The job becomes more difficult when network size grows. Redundant and irrelevant features also
impacts classifier’s performance [67]. In the next section we will discuss how redundant and irrelevant
features can be removed from the dataset while maintaining and even improving the performance of the
classifier.
6. Feature Selection (FS)
Feature selection is an important step which is performed to select important features. The objective of
feature selection is to reduce the effect of ”curse of dimensionality” by removing redundant or irrelevant
features without compromising on classifier accuracy [68].
Feature selection is NP-hard problem [69]. Finding a subset of optimal features is a difficult tasks. A
major challenge is to choose appropriate feature-selection methods that can precisely determine the relevance
of features to the intrusion detection task and the redundancy between features.
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Figure 6: Confusion Matrix for KNN, NB, RF and MLP
6.1. Feature Selection Methods
Researchers have proposed three different approaches for feature selection [70] (i) Filter (ii) Wrapper (iii)
Embedded.
6.1.1. Filter Method
Filter based feature selection algorithms are totally independent from any predictor function [71]. It
is based on feature ranking algorithms, that make use of an evaluation criterion and a limit or threshold
to calculate the feature relevance and decide whether to keep that feature or discard it. The feature
relevance is determined by its capability to provide useful information about the different classes [67]. Filter
algorithms are usually computationally less expensive than the other methods [68]. Pearsons Correlation,
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Chi-Square method etc. are few examples of filter based feature
selection technique.
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6.1.2. Wrapper Method
Wrapper based feature selection methods has three components: a search strategy, a predictor, and an
evaluation function [70].
• The search strategy determines the subset of features to be evaluated.
• The predictor can be any classification method.
• Classifier (predictor) performance is used as the evaluation function to assess the subset of features
defined by the search strategy so as to find the optimum subset that gives the best accuracy of it.
The performance in terms of selection of strong features of wrapper methods is better than filter based
techniques, however they are more time consuming and require more computational resources [72]. Se-
quential search and Heuristic based search algorithms are two main categories of wrapper based feature
selection.
6.1.3. Embedded Method
Wrapper based techniques are more time consuming. Embedded methods incorporate an interaction
between feature selection and learning process. They make better use of the available data and avoid
retraining the predictor for every selected feature subset [73]. There are various embedded feature selection
techniques have been proposed in the literature such as Micro-Genetic Algorithm (GA), Embedded Particle
Swarm Optimization (PSO), etc. [74].
6.2. Studied Feature Selection Methods
Generally entropy or correlation based techniques are commonly employed for feature selection / weight-
ing. Thus in this study we also examined gain ratio, chi-square method and pearson correlation method for
feature selection. However in addition to these three approaches we also studied metaheuristic - combina-
torial optimization based approach i.e. tabu search. The reason for including this approach in our study is
that it has shown improved results over entropy and correlation based methods [75]. All four approaches
we used in our research are presented below.
1. Gain Ratio
2. Chi-Square Method
3. Pearson Correlation Method
4. Tabu Search
6.2.1. Gain Ratio
Gain Ratio is a derive version of Information Gain (IG). IG is an entropy based feature selection method
that measures the importance or relevance of a feature with respect to the corresponding class. Entropy
can be defined as a measure of unpredictability or uncertainty irrespective of the origin [76] and can be
calculated by using Eq. 7
H(S) = −
c∑
i=1
pilogbpi (7)
where,
S = training dataset,
C = No. of target classes,
pi = proportion of examples in S belonging to target class i
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Gain Ratio depends upon the Information Gain of that feature. Information Gain can be calculated by
using Eq. 8. Gain Ratio is the ratio of IG to Intrinsic Value (IV).
Gain(S,A) = H(S)−
∑
v∈A
|Sv|
|S| H(Sv) (8)
where,
S = training set,
6.2.2. Chi-Square Feature Method
Chi-Square is feature selection method based on χ2 test. It calculates the independence of two events A
and B if P (AB) = P (A)P (B) or P (A|B) = P (A) and P (B|A) = P (B). In feature selection, we actually
want to calculate whether output variable (class) is dependent on input variable (feature) or not. If it is
independent, then the input variable is a candidate feature that may be irrelevant and can be removed.
Mathematically, Chi-Square test can be expressed as Eq. 9,
χ2 =
n∑
i=1
(
Ei −Oi
)2
Ei
(9)
where,
Ei is the expected value of feature,
Oi is the observed value of feature,
6.2.3. Pearson Correlation Method
Pearson correlation is a filter based feature selection approach used to measure linear relationship or
dependency between two variables. It is used to find the association between continuous features and the
class attribute. It is also used to find feature-feature correlation to remove redundant features.
6.2.4. Tabu Search
Tabu Search (TS) was first introduced by Fred Glover [21, 22] as a general iterative metaheuristic for
solving combinatorial optimization problems. It is a form of local neighborhood search. Each solution
S ∈ Ω has an associated set of neighbors N(S) ⊆ Ω, where Ω is a set of feasible solutions. A solution
S′ ∈ N(S) can be reached from S by an operation called a move to S’. TS moves from a solution to its best
admissible neighbor, even if this causes the objective function to deteriorate. To avoid cycling, solutions
that were recently explored are declared forbidden or tabu for a number of iterations. The tabu status of
a solution is overridden when certain criteria (aspiration criteria) are satisfied. Sometimes intensification
and diversification strategies are used to improve the search. In the first case, the search is accentuated in
promising regions of the feasible domain. In the second case, an attempt is made to consider solutions in a
broad area of the search space. TS algorithm parameters are mentioned in Table 10
We used wrapper based approach to calculate the fitness of each solution generated randomly in TS. We
used Random Forest (RF) Classifier as a predictor in TS-wrapper. RF is discussed in section 5.1.3. Fitness
of each solution is calculated based on Eq. 10. We run the simulation for 100 iterations and found the
optimal solution having 17 features (including class label also) at 76th iteration.
Cost = α ∗ e+ (1− α) ∗ n (10)
where,
α is a user-defined parameters between [0, 1]. We set α to 0.5,
e is RF error,
n is number of features included in the candidate solution.
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Table 10: Tabu Search algorithm parameters
Parameter Value
Tabu List Size 7
No. of neighbor 6
Aspiration Level 0.05
No. of Iterations 100
Gain Ratio and Pearson Correlation based methods calculate the importance of each feature in terms
of ”Rank or weight” ranging between [0, 1]. For Chi Square method we normalized the output between [0,
1]. Table 11 present attributes and their corresponding weights for all three filter based feature selection
technique and TS. Tabu Search column consists of binary value ’0’ or ’1’, zero means the attribute is not
present in the final optimal feature set and has been removed.
6.3. Results After Feature Selection
We apply a threshold (a cut-off) on the attributes’ weights for all filter based techniques. Initially we
selected all those features whose weights are greater than or equal to 0.2 (cut-off). Then we apply a cut-off
at 0.15. Figure 7 and 8 presents classifier accuracy against number of features and Table 13 and 14 presents
classifier computational complexity for thresholds 0.2 and 0.15 respectively.
Tabu Search gives us better results and reduces number of features up to 62%. We observe 1 - 2%
increase for RF, upto 4% increase for KNN and a significant increase for MLP which is upto 7%. We also
observe that there is a slight decrease in the accuracy for NB. The time complexity for TS is also significantly
reduced. Time complexity for MLP is exceptionally reduced by 95% while for RF, NB and KNN classifiers
it is reduced up to 40%, 45% and 20% respectively.
We also compared the results obtained from TS-RF with GA-LR proposed by [77]. Table 12 shows that
TS-RF achieved higher accuracy at lower number features compared to GA-LR wrapper method.
7. Conclusion & Future Work
Signature-based IDS can only detect attacks whose signatures are developed and incorporated in the
signature database while anomaly-based systems can detect unknown attacks. However they require ample
amount of training time after deploying in production network which is usually not a possible option. In
addition to that their false positive rate is very high. In this research we studied potential application of
machine learning to detect network-based unknown attacks. Our study focused on UNSW-NB15 dataset
because it consists of hybrid real modern normal network traffic with synthetic updated attacks. Initially,
we applied machine learning on the original dataset without applying any feature selection technique, the
key findings are summarized below.
1. We achieved good classification accuracy for RF and KNN algorithms while acceptable and average
results for MLP and NB are achieved respectively.
2. Classifier detection accuracy declined for attacks category having low number of instances in the
dataset. It can be improved if it has more number of samples for that traffic type or well balanced
dataset.
3. Confusion matrices show that classifiers misclassified worms and analysis traffic to exploits category.
One common possible reason is the low sample size of analysis and worm traffic.
In the second phase of our research we proposed a new wrapper-based Tabu Search - Random Forest
(TS-RF) feature selection algorithm for IDS dataset. TS-RF wrapper exploits Tabu search metaheuristic
algorithm for feature search / feature weighting and Random forest as a learning algorithm. The selection of
optimal feature set is determined by maximizing classification accuracy and minimizing number of features.
The optimal features generated from TS-RF are compared with three filter-based feature selection techniques
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Figure 7: Classifier Accuracy vs No. of Features (Cutoff 0.2)
Figure 8: Classifier Accuracy vs No. of Features at (Cutoff 0.15)
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Table 11: Results of Feature Selection Methods
Feature Pearson Correlation Method Gain Ratio Method Chi Square Method Tabu Search
ct dst sport ltm 0.395 0.377 0.320699574 1
ct dst src ltm 0.363 0.175 0.305822512 1
ct src dport ltm 0.363 0.262 0.286043105 1
sttl 0.36 0.505 0.282999734 1
ct srv dst 0.35 0.19 0.32740075 1
ct srv src 0.348 0.172 0.306081844 1
ct dst ltm 0.337 0.195 0.288217833 1
xServ 0.24 0.38 0.291684417 1
is sm ips ports 0.096 0.225 0.005158653 1
smean 0.095 0.25 0.745379259 1
dloss 0.054 0.188 0.219287557 1
ct flw http mthd 0.051 0.121 0.038753231 1
dbytes 0.043 0.219 0.491079696 1
sbytes 0.024 0.272 1 1
sloss 0.022 0.18 0.178023703 1
response body len 0.014 0.182 0.082514424 1
ct src ltm 0.312 0.153 0.24359123 0
ct state ttl 0.306 0.432 0.28834849 0
xState 0.284 0.328 0.165153803 0
swin 0.268 0.278 0.093005441 0
dwin 0.263 0.271 0.090222665 0
xProt 0.245 0.291 0.283548039 0
rate 0.225 0.17 0.302254754 0
dttl 0.214 0.456 0.283484592 0
dtcpb 0.208 0.271 0.09022709 0
stcpb 0.208 0.271 0.090244809 0
dmean 0.207 0.2 0.364841579 0
dload 0.203 0.205 0.276768666 0
ackdat 0.164 0.254 0.216142431 0
tcprtt 0.161 0.259 0.22409221 0
synack 0.141 0.251 0.225966996 0
sload 0.098 0.22 0.676250756 0
sinpkt 0.092 0.132 0.245189132 0
dpkts 0.067 0.207 0.291838911 0
dur 0.062 0.156 0.29300127 0
djit 0.052 0.174 0.206908102 0
ct ftp cmd 0.047 0.123 0 0
is ftp login 0.047 0.123 0 0
spkts 0.045 0.168 0.228175389 0
trans depth 0.041 0.117 0.018255278 0
sjit 0.033 0.168 0.215903334 0
dinpkt 0.03 0.219 0.270306487 0
i.e. Gain Ratio, Chi-Square, Pearson Correlation and one wrapper-based method i.e GA-LR. Experiments
show promising results for TS-RF method. Key findings of the simulation are summarized below.
1. TS-RF reduces the number of features by 62% while improving classification accuracy sufficiently.
2. Since TS-RF has reduced the number of features due to which the time complexity is also reduced
24
Table 12: Comparison of TS-RF with GA-LR Wrapper Method Results show that TS-RF achieved higher accuracy at
reduced no. of feature
Feature Selection Method No. of Features Classifier Accuracy
GA-LR 20 Decision Tree 81.72
TS-RF 16 Decision Tree 83.59
Table 13: Shows the impact of feature selection techniques on time complexity of classifiers at Cutoff=0.2, +ve and -ve values
show percentage improvement and decrement respectively
Feature Selection Method RF (%) NB (%) KNN (%) MLP (%)
Chi-Square +11.512 +25.76 No improvement +0.90
Gain Ratio +33.30 +46.01 -60 +8.02
Pearson Correlation +37.47 +57.67 -40 -67.55
Tabu Search +39.44 +45.40 +20 +95.40
Table 14: Impact of feature selection techniques on time complexity of classifiers at Cutoff=0.15, +ve and -ve values show
percentage improvement and decrement respectively
Feature Selection Method RF (%) NB (%) KNN (%) MLP (%)
Chi-Square +9.42 +26.38 +40 -87.70
Gain Ratio +6.88 +12.88 +40 -2.24
Pearson Correlation +27.37 +44.17 +60 +4.44
Tabu Search +39.44 +45.40 +20 +95.40
significantly.
3. TS-RF achieved better accuracy at less number of features as compared to GA-LR.
In future we plan to address class imbalance problem present in UNSW-NB15 dataset because it does not
only impact the classifier accuracy but also it increases misclassification rate and false positives. Extraction
of new discriminant / salient features from the original data by applying deep learning may also help to
reduce misclassification rate and improve accuracy. Another possible avenue is to work on the application
of metaheurisitc algorithms like TS or other evolutionary computing or nature inspired algorithm for threat
detection and feature selection because these optimization algorithms have also shown better results in other
domains.
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